Book Review. For Whom the National Parks? by Tarlock, A. Dan
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1981
Book Review. For Whom the National Parks?
A. Dan Tarlock
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Natural Resources Management and
Policy Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tarlock, A. Dan, "Book Review. For Whom the National Parks?" (1981). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 2392.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2392
For Whom the National Parks?
A. Dan Tarlock*
MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NA-
TIONAL PARKS. By Joseph L. Sax. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Univer-
sity of Michigan Press. 1980. 152 pp. $10.00 hardbound, $5.95
paperbound.
Modern environmentalism has its roots in the late nineteenth-
and early twentieth-century reaction to the scientific conservation
movement.' Scientific conservation was in turn a reaction to the
then-prevailing ethic that natural resources should be exploited as
rapidly as possible.2 The conservation movement did not challenge
the need to exploit natural resources, but argued that the rate of ex-
ploitation should be slowed to achieve a maximum return over time.
From this movement came this century's prevailing management
ethic: Resources should be exploited for multiple-use objectives to
promote efficient allocation.3 The forerunners of the modern envi-
ronmental movement were, by contrast, primarily concerned with
one goal: preserving large areas of the public lands in their natural
state. This single-use philosophy, based on appeals to higher spiri-
tual values and loose notions of the moral imperatives of ecology, 4
was an appealing if ambiguous model for the environmental move-
* A.B. 1962; LL.B. 1965, Stanford University. Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology, Chicago-Kent School of Law.
1. "The contradictions that beset modern environmentalism reflect the divergent evolu-
tion of two ideological themes which arose at the birth of the conservation movement ....
One line of thought can be identified as the ecocentric mode ... [which rests] 'upon the supposi-
tion of a natural order in which all things [move] according to natural law, in which the most
delicate and perfect balance was maintained up to the point at which man entered with all
his ignorance and presumption.' The other viewpoint is the technocentric mode characterized
.. . as the application of rational and 'value free' scientific and managerial techniques by a
professional elite, who regarded the natural environment as 'neutral stuff' from which man
could profitably shape his destiny." T. O'RiORDAN, ENVIRONMENTALISM 1 (1976).
2. The leading analysis of this movement is S. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL
OF EFFICIENCY (1959).
3. For a lucid statement of the theory of multiple-use management, see Krutilla &
Haigh, An Integrated Approach to National Forest Management, 8 ENVWV L. 373 (1978).
4. The most influential statement of the view that ecology can teach man how to man-
age his resources is A. LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNTY ALMANAC (1949).
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ment when it gained prominence on the political agenda of the late
1960s.'
Modern environmentalists tried to translate the preservation
ethic into a general management prescription for all life support sys-
tem resources: air, land, and water.6 Lawyers, eager to adapt the
common law to changing social preferences, began to argue that
courts and administrative agencies should recognize ecosystem alter-
ation per se as a legally cognizable injury.7 Before this era the com-
mon law protected only demonstrated injuries to human health and
to resources put to beneficial use by humans.' And even in this era
the common law has proven quite resistant to a significant expansion
of the category of protected interests, though environmentalists have
successfully persuaded Congress to replace conservation principles,
which generally seek to minimize the known social costs of unre-
strained exploitation, with preservation principles in much of the en-
vironmental legislation of the 1970s.9 However, preservation remains
an ambiguous moral and scientific principle, and its merits are still
the subject of intense debate.
In Mountains Without Handrails. Refections on the National Parks, the
leading environmental law scholar, Professor Joseph L. Sax, consid-
ers the preservation ethic in the context of our national parks system.
Mountains Without Handrails examines the growing problem of over-
5. See Andrews, Class Politics or Democratic Reform: Environmentalism and American Political
Institutions, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 221 (1980).
6. This "new conservation" or "new preservation" goes beyond the original preservation
ethic because it is premised on the belief that "saving the environment is impossible without
changes in the economic, social, and ideological fabric of the modem world." Hart, The Envi-
ronmental Movement: Fulfillment of the Renaissance Propheq?, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 501, 519
(1980). J. PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE 3-40 (1974) identifies and traces
two distinct traditions in man's attitude toward nature: the desire to dominate nature and
the willingness to cooperate with it.
7. One of the first cases to consider this argument was Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency, 2 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1135 (Dist. Ct. Minn. 1970). The story
of this epic litigation is told in R. BARTLETT, THE RESERVE MINING CONTROVERSY (1980).
8. Tarlock, A Comment on Meers' Introduction to Environmental Thought, 50 IND. L.J.
454 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976) (declaration of goals and
policies); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. III 1979) (primary and secondary air quali-
ty standards); id. § 7491 (prevention of significant deterioration). Preservation principles, un-
like management principles, demand that environmental damage be avoided without regard
to cost. Thus, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 has been interpreted as precluding consideration of the cost
of compliance where variances are sought from the standards of the Clean Water Act. EPA v.
National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980). Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 has been
interpreted as allowing the EPA to set public health standards without regard to economic
cost and technological feasibility. Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
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crowding of the national parks and discusses how our national parks
ought to be managed, which to its author means asking who should
be encouraged to use them. The basic purpose of a park reservation
or creation is to preserve something special, and thus the manage-
ment philosophy has always been one of single, as opposed to multi-
ple, use. However, as the stock of unique areas on the original
retained public lands has been exhausted, the Park Service, like all
good government firms, has sought to expand its product lines to at-
tract congressional support. But the growing demand on limited
park resources has forced the Park Service to make difficult decisions
about the proper level of park "enhancement" and use and has em-
broiled the Service in the single- versus multiple-purpose debate. Al-
though the special mission of the national parks limits Professor Sax's
argument primarily to its immediate context, it has some relevance
for other resource conflicts, where intensity of use is the issue.
Despite its narrow focus, Mountains Without Handrails is well worth
reading. Professor Sax has written an elegant, concise, well-
researched, and tightly reasoned argument in favor of severely limit-
ing park access and development. The book begs Congress not "to
make national parks all things to all people in every location,"' and
urges the Park Service to interpret its broad statutory mandate in the
preservationist tradition." Whether a court could order the Depart-
ment of the Interior to conform to Professor Sax's vision of proper
park management policy is not directly addressed.
However, Park Service discretion is not unlimited,1 2 and Profes-
sor Sax's book will undoubtedly be cited in the increasing flow of
litigation challenging Park Service discretion. Such increased litiga-
tion seems inevitable under the administration of the current Secre-
tary of the Interior, James G. Watt. Secretary Watt wants to follow
park management policies that are diametrically opposed to the his-
toric preservationist vision of the parks. Specifically, he wants to halt
the acquisition of new land for the system, dispose of inferior, newer
units of the system near urban areas, increase the role of private con-
cessioners, and "err on the side of public use versus preservation."13
10. P. 105.
11. P. 106.
12. See Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 448-49 (D.D.C. 1980) (interpreting 16
U.S.C. § la-I (Supp. III 1979)). A fine collection of materials on the law of the Park Service
and related issues can be found in G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND
AND RESOURCES LAW (1981).
13. Secretary Watt's thinking on national park policy to date was most fully spelled out
in a speech delivered to the Conference of National Park Concessioners on March 9, 1981
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
To add insult to injury, the Secretary counters the moral basis of
preservation with a theological argument. In his now-celebrated
statement before Congress, Secretary Watt expressed doubts about
the need for increased preservation efforts because "I do not know
how many future generations we can count on before the Lord
returns."
1 4
Thus, Professor Sax's book is more timely than he thought when
he set out to prod a basically friendly Park Service to further limited
use and development efforts. This review discusses the book's policy
argument and then examines the legal implications of preservationist
policy by discussing some management strategies that Professor Sax
primarily developed in two law review articles.
I. PRESERVATION AS POLICY
Mountains Without Handrails argues that access to the national
parks should be limited to those who have the sensitivity and willing-
ness to encounter nature on its own terms. This is a tough, even
harsh policy, much like France declaring that the Louvre will only be
open to persons with a demonstrated capability to appreciate art.
The core of Sax's argument is captured in his criticism of a Park
Service plan to build a tramway to the top of a mountain in
Guadalupe National Park in Texas to allow people to look down into
a wilderness area. In a classic example of bureaucratic hyperbole,
the Service justified the plan as necessary to allow park visitors "truly
a wilderness threshold experience." This will not do for Professor
Sax. "Peering at a wilderness from a tramway station. . . is not a
wilderness experience; the sense of wilderness is not achieved by
standing at its threshold, but by engaging it from within." 15 Like-
wise Professor Sax would restrict the right to float the inner Canyon
of the Colorado to those who come in the spirit of Major John Wes-
ley Powell. 6 "The inner Canyon stretch of the river should. . . be
limited to those who are willing to make their own schedule, to en-
(mimeo copy on file with author). See generalo James G. Watt Nomination, Hearings Before the
Senate Comm on Energy andNatural Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Shabecoff, Administra-
tion Seeks Greater Role For Entrepreneurs at Federal Parks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
14. The quotation is explained as a Christian version ofscientific conservation in NEws-
WEEK, June 29, 1981, at 29.
15. P. 63 (emphasis in original).
16. Major Powell was the first known person to descend the Colorado River. See J.W.
POWELL, THE EXPLORATION OF THE COLORADO RIVER AND rrs CANYONS (Dover ed. 1961),
and Wallace Stegner's great biography of this fascinating scientist and Western visionary, W.
STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN (1954).
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counter snakes, and to prepare their own meals."'17
Although Professor Sax is not the first to make it, this is a hard
argument to make for two reasons. First, the theory-although not
the practice-of American public land policy has been to distribute
land and access as widely as possible. 8 This philosophy has been
carried over from the disposition era to the modern era of retention
and management. In fact, the Park Service has long used increased
use of the national parks to justify increased appropriations. Hence,
there is an element of estoppel working against a limited access pol-
icy. Second, the argument cuts against the deeply held view in
American society that individual choice, no matter how silly or crass,
is valued. The person who comes to view the Grand Canyon in the
spirit of Emerson or John Wesley Powell is no better than one who
comes in a recreation vehicle with a locker full of beer and a portable
television set.
A. Preservation and Paternalism
Mountains Without Handrails surpasses much of the previous preser-
vation literature by its candid admission of elitism and its willingness
to grapple with the hard questions that lie beneath the surface of the
traditional pro-preservation arguments. Professor Sax frankly admits
that many management choices advocated by preservationists must
be justified on moral rather than scientific grounds.' 9 "Right or
wrong, persuasive or not, his [the preservationist's] claim is that he
knows something about what other people ought to want and how
they can go about getting it .. ".. ,20 He urges preservationists to
frankly admit their paternalism and take the chance, which they
must in a free society, that their ideas will be accepted as a matter of
grace, not of right.2'
Professor Sax's argument for limiting parks to those willing to
17. P. 96.
18. See generallv P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAw DEVELOPMENT (1968).
19. "[Plarks are not self-justifying. . . .Your [the preservationist] vision is not neces-
sarily one that will commend itself to the majority. It rests on a set of moral and aesthetic
attitudes whose force is not strengthened either by contemptuous disdain of those who ques-
tion your conception of what a national park should be, or by taking refuge in claims of
ecological necessity." Pp. 108-09.
20. P. 59 (emphasis in original).
21. Professor Sax wisely does not argue that park preservation, as he defines it, is a
constitutionally protected right. See p. 104. The preservationists have had unlimited access
to the political process and are a richly rewarded minority, not an oppressed one. Those
wishing to consult an argument of sorts for minority rights may read the late Mr. Justice
Douglas's book. W. DOUGLAS, A WILDERNESS BiLL OF RIGHTS (1965).
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rough it is a post-Freudian version of the mystic legacy of Emerson,
Thoreau, and Saint John (Muir) of the Mountains that raw nature,
if properly experienced, purifies the soul.22 Sax believes that one
should go into the wilderness, as Moses did, to find God.23 Parks
provide an opportunity for self-fulfillment not offered elsewhere in
modern society. They also help to counter the excessive urge to con-
sume that is fostered by a mass, technological society.
Americans have always had an ambivalent attitude toward na-
ture. Of necessity, we have had to subdue it, and we have been
frightened by the scale and bleakness of the land. We have also been
inspired and awed by the magnificent legacy that we discovered and
have instinctively felt that it was wrong to "civilize" such grandeur.
2 4
The current intense debate over what types of recreation are proper
in natural areas reflects these attitudes. To some, natural areas pro-
vide a chance to test one's ability to dominate nature through tech-
nology. The oil driller and the off-road vehicle driver are the modern
miner and frontiersman. For others, natural areas are places for
calm reflection.
Preservationist park and wilderness users consist of hard-driving
mountain climbers and backpackers as well as gentler nature observ-
ers. Professor Sax finds both these activities praiseworthy (the latter
more than the former) because both rely on individual physical and
mental skills. This self-reliance enables the participants to achieve
higher levels of experience than can be achieved in activities sup-
ported by motorized power. Professor Sax feels that park policy
should only promote activities that rely on individual skill. He ar-
22. Professor Sax's argument is an extension of the transcendentalist attempt to use a
vision of nature to reconcile the tension between unrestrained individualism and obligation
toward the community. "Their rudimentary understanding of the ecosystem led the tran-
scendentalists to believe that democracy could only be attained by imitating what they un-
derstood as the lesson of nature-the pursuit of self-actualization and creative diversity within
mutually sustaining communities." T. O'RIORDAN, SuPra note 1, at 3. O'Riordan's summary
is based on an interesting book too little known to environmental lawyers: W. BURCH,
DAYDREAMS AND NIGHTMARES: A SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAY ON THE AMERICAN ENVIRON-
MENT (1971).
23. See p. 46.
24. See Sagoff, On Preseving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 226-44 (1974)
(intellectual history of the transformation of the idea that nature should be conquered to the
idea that it should be respected). Willa Cather captures our ambivalence well in describing
the impact of virgin Nebraska on a young immigrant: "But the great fact was the land itself,
which seemed to overwhelm the little beginnings of human society that struggled in its som-
bre wastes. It was from facing this vast hardness that the boy's mouth had become so bitter,
because he felt that men were too weak to make any mark here, that the land wanted to be let
alone, to preserve its own fierce strength, its peculiar, savage kind of beauty, its uninterrupted
mournfulness." W. CATHER, 0 PIONEERS! 15 (1913).
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gues that power-based recreationists must moderate their appetities
for "junk" recreation.2 5  Parks should encourage recreation that
"draws on intensiveness of experience" in contrast to "intensiveness
of impact":26 "[W]e should develop a taste for [reflective recreation]
and . . .stimulating the appetite should be a primary function of
national parks. 27
To support its thesis that parks should be managed for those will-
ing to engage in active but contemplative recreation, Mountains With-
out Handrails draws on a wide variety of sources, in addition to the
traditional park histories and nature literature. Professor Sax credits
a previously obscure report on the Yosemite Valley, prepared by
Frederick Law Olmsted in 1865, as the foundation of modern
preservationist management philosophies.2 ' A detailed discussion of
the report is followed by an intensely personal and creative medita-
tion on the literature of sport. He concludes that individual sport,
broadly defined, can provide a means of spiritual fulfillment other-
wise denied man in a mass society. From this vision a clear park
policy emerges in the last three chapters: Automobile and other
power access to scenic sights should be minimized;29 lodging should
be rustic, not luxurious, so that a park visit will be an end in and of
itself '° and access should be rationed to provide the few who can
enter with a high-quality recreation experience.31
25. See p. 75. The term is mine. Professor Sax writes that "the will to power is ulti-
mately self-defeating, and that the preservationists' moralistic stance may be a practical solu-
tion as well, even for those who can only see the problem as one of perpetually insufficient
physical resources." P. 76.
26. P. 76.
27. P. 61.
28. Frederick Law Olmsted is best remembered today as a landscape architect, but he
had an amazing range of experiences. His contact with California began in 1863 when he
came West to manage the Mariposa Estate for the group that took the property from General
Fremont after he went bankrupt. Olmsted was subsequently appointed to the Commission
created by California to administer Yosemite Park. His major intellectual concern at that
time was to justify the nonaristocratic nature of American society to European aristocrats. See
L. ROPER, FLO: A BIOGRAPHY OF FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED 247 (1973). Consistent with
his intense faith in the American experiment, he stressed the importance of reserving parks for
all the people. Professor Sax gives full due to Olmsted's faith in the progress of the common
man, but confines that faith to its historical context, preferring instead to emphasize Olim-
sted's vision of individual self-realization. Pp. 24-26. This restatement of Olmsted is, of
course, more consistent with a limited access policy than is a literal reading of Olmsted's
nineteenth-century vision. The tension between democracy as a theory of individual fulfill-
ment and as one of societal fulfillment has important ramifications for park management
policy. See notes 32-49 infra and accompanying text.
29. P. 81.
30. P. 88.
31. P. 94.
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B. The Merits of Preservation as Policy
Ultimately, the merits of Professor Sax's policy prescriptions can
only be confessed; they cannot be proved. I agree with his prescrip-
tion for the older (and some newer) parks, although for different rea-
sons. Yellowstone, Yosemite, the Grand Canyon, Glacier, the Grand
Tetons, and the Canyonlands in Utah are part of our civilized heri-
tage. Like Mozart's operas, Milton's poems, and ancient Jerusalem,
areas of awesome scenic grandeur are treasures of Western civiliza-
tion that must be passed on as intact as possible from generation to
generation. Literature and music can protect themselves since inter-
pretation is reversible, but architecture and the natural landscape
cannot, and therefore man's policy toward them must be based on
respect for the original conception. 2 Just as The Mamnage of Ft'garo is
not Shampoo, neither should the Grand Teton National Park be
treated as a full-service resort. In short, a park is a living museum. 33
Professor Sax's argument for preservation draws on the most optimis-
tic strain in Judeo-Christian thinking, faith in man's progress.34 For
me, however, it is enough that certain national parks are irreplace-
able and have occupied an important role in shaping this nation's
perception of itself 35 Thus, there is a case for preventing people
from harming the parks, regardless of whether those who visit them
are somehow better off from the experience.
This justification is more limited than that Professor Sax offers
because it does not apply with equal force to all units of the park
system. Although the Park Service is a single-purpose agency with a
duty to maximize the value of the resources under its jurisdiction,36
the vision of a democratic public lands policy insures that the Service
is not free from the single- versus multiple-use debate. The Park
32. Set pp. 105-06. In fact, management plans currently being considered for the
Grand Canyon, Yellowstone, and Yosemite would severely limit visitor access and park en-
hancement projects in an attempt to preserve the original vision of these parks.
33. Professor Sax frankly admits that parks belong to everyone. P. 103.
34. See also Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental
Law, 83 YALE LJ. 1315 (1974).
35. Professor Mark Sagoff has presented a sophisticated non-utilitarian argument for
the preservation of natural environments which asserts that "[t]he obligation to preserve na-
ture.... is an obligation to our cultural tradition, to the values which we have cherished and
in terms of which nature and this nation are still to be described." Sagoff, supra note 24, at
265. Professor Sagoff, a philosopher, concludes that park preservation is a constitutional
right. Id. at 266-67. As Professor Sax and others have shown, this is bad constitutional law.
E.., Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Stractures: Learning From Natures Fu-
ture, 84 YALE L.J. 545 (1975). Sagofi's argument, however, is a rationale for preservation
management policies.
36. See notes 59-63 infla and accompanying text.
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Service has always had to promote its product aggressively to per-
suade Congress to appropriate money, has always been attacked by
both commodity users and preservationists over each balance that it
struck between purity and access,37 and has generally responded to
increased public demand for access with requests for more funds for
personnel and facilities. Many of the newer additions to the system
are National Recreation Areas, 8 located near metropolitan areas in
the effort to "get parks to the people. ' 39 Thus, one can argue that
the democratic ethic in public land policy requires that the Service
accept some park development, and therefore that strict preserva-
tionist policies in some parks must be compensated by more intensive
(but not unlimited) development in other parts of the system.
Mountains Without Handrails denies both the philosophical and
practical justifications for such a balancing policy. Professor Sax, of
course, acknowledges that the park setting determines intensity of ex-
perience, but nonetheless insists that strict preservation should be ap-
plied not only to Yosemite and Yellowstone, but also to Gateway
National Recreation Area in the middle of New York City.40 He
refuses to concede that the preservationist vision is undemocratic. As
I understand him, he argues that it is not undemocratic to impose
limited park access on a majority that wants unlimited access for two
not completely integrated reasons. The first is a denial of "[t]he no-
tion that commitment to democratic principles compels the assump-
tion of unlimited abundance and a rejection of the possibility of
scarcity."'4 1 Second, his suggested sacrifices, it is asserted, are demo-
cratic because they are voluntarily assumed in the name of self-pater-
nalism. Professor Sax makes the dubious assumption that because
we frequently coerce ourselves into making private choices that we
do not enjoy in the hope of improving ourselves, we will also wel-
come, or at least tolerate, uplifting public choices.42
37. This struggle between purists and promoters is seen as an almost Miltonic struggle
between good and evil in the standard park service history. J. IsE, OUR NATIONAL PARK
POLIcY: A CRITICAL HISTORY (1961).
38. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 460n-1, 460kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
39. Statement of Walter Hickel, Secretary, Dep't of Interior, U.S. Dep't of Interior
News Release (Sept. 14, 1970), quoted in Futrell, Parks to the People: New Directions for the Na-
tional Park System, 25 EMORY L.J. 255, 264 (1976).
40. Pp. 83-85.
41. P. 83.
42. Pp. 50-55. This argument is developed more explicitly in a lecture that Professor
Sax gave at Creighton University School of Law, published as Sax, Fashioning a RecreationPoli. for our National Parklands The Philosophy of Choice and the Choice of Philosophy, 12 CREIGH-
TON L. REv. 973, 976-85 (1979).
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
Professor Sax argues his case well, but I am not persuaded that
one can move from examples of individual sacrifice--devoting a
month to War and Peace-to collective sacrifice. Nor am I alone in
my doubts. Many thoughtful scholars have questioned whether envi-
ronmental values are consistent with the liberal democratic tradi-
tion. 3 These criticisms aside, Mountains Without Handrails is a more
powerful argument for limited access to national parks than the pre-
vious literature. One issue that Professor Sax does not adequately
address, however, is how access should be limited.44 The tension be-
tween the "tragedy of the commons" 45 problem and democratic val-
ues can, at least for parks, be partly reconciled by fair methods of
access limitation. The Park Service and others concerned with the
deterioration of the national parks usually recommend limiting ac-
cess by first come, first served rationing. By contrast, economists gen-
erally recommend that once the level of use of a resource is
determined through the political process, the most efficient way to
implement the decision is to price the right to use the resource. 46
Studies such as the Public Land Law Review Commission's have
rejected pricing as nonegalitarian, 7 but this is a weak reason. In-
deed, pricing would seem an ideal way to allocate entry to the more
remote national parks. The immediate benefits of park use are high-
ly concentrated both by percentages of the population and by in-
come levels.48 National park access would not be listed by many as a
basic public service "owed" by government to any citizen who wants
it. And at all levels of government, user charges, rather than across
the board taxes, are an increasingly accepted means of financing cer-
tain public services.49 Users of remote parks are a small, largely well-
to-do group. Therefore, charging for use of national parks will not
interfere with whatever income redistribution policies this country
43. See, e.g., W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 184-99 (1977).
44. For example, Professor Sax approves of rationing, p. 83, but he does not discuss the
different means of rationing.
45. See Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
46. See, e.g., J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES (1968).
47. See Johnson, Recreation, Fish, Wildlife and the Public Land Law Review Commision, 6
LAND & WATER L. REv. 283, 289 (1970).
48. A widely cited rationale for park preservation is the concept of option demand. See,
e.g., Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 780-82 (1967). In brief, op-
tion demand is used to explain why the market fails to reveal the preferences of both those
living and those yet to be born to value future visits to a park. Access pricing is consistent
with the theory of option demand because it provides a means by which present generations
can exercise their option in a manner that is consistent with the hypothetical values placed on
the park by future users and future generations.
49. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 705-84 (1981).
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follows. Within legislative and administrative ceilings to limit park
access, however, some subsidies may be appropriate to temper the
perceived inequities of price rationing.
II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRESERVATION POLICY
A limited access policy has important legal implications for man-
agement of both the parks themselves and surrounding land. Devel-
opment around parks has long concerned Park Service officials. But
they have been reluctant for legal and political reasons to assert
much power over land development outside park boundaries, except
where Congress has expressly included extraterritorial duties in en-
abling legislation. Professor Sax's essay poses three major legal ques-
tions: (A) Does the Park Service have adequate enabling authority
to implement a limited access, high-intensity-of-experience policy?
(B) Is the Park Service under a legal duty-statutory, constitutional,
or common law-to tilt its decisions toward the vision articulated in
Mountains Without Handrails? and (C) Does the Park Service have the
constitutional power to prevent harmful developments on the perim-
eter of the system and to impose federal land use controls on pri-
vately owned buffer areas?
A. Enabling Authority
Professor Sax wants park facilities to be developed only to the
extent necessary to cater to adventurous visitors. If necessary, park
access would be rationed to heighten the intensity of experience for
those who enter. Existing Park Service enabling legislation appears
to grant the Department of the Interior authority to implement both
parts of this policy, although severe access limitation may be chal-
lenged in the courts. First of all, the Service is directed "to conserve
the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life
therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner
and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment
of future generations. ' ' 5° This preservation mandate was reaffirmed
by Congress in 1978.51 Secondly, in drafting Park Service enabling
legislation, Congress has generally been content to define grandly the
purpose of the park system and to delegate to the Secretary of Inte-
rior the power to make "such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary or proper for the use and management of the parks, monu-
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
51. Id. § la-1 (Supp. III 1979); see text accompanying note 66 infra.
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ments, and reservations under the jurisdiction of the National Park
Service."52
Park Service management decisions are informal administrative
actions. Such actions are reviewable,53 but the Secretary's decision
can only be set aside if it is arbitrary. Furthermore, many of Profes-
sor Sax's proposals call for nonaction and are therefore effectively
isolated from judicial review. Decisions not to enhance the park to
accommodate the less strenuous would seem to fall well within the
Secretary's discretion. The cumulative effect of these decisions will,
of course, be to limit access, but the impact will be felt only
gradually.
More direct decisions to withdraw part of a park from use and to
ration access can be challenged on the ground that the Service's basic
mandate is to preserve park land for general public enjoyment. But
here too, the Secretary's broad mandate makes his management deci-
sions largely immune from review unless they involve an issue that
Congress has specifically addressed. Consequently, there are few
cases interpreting the Secretary's management discretion. Further, it
will be difficult for courts to find sufficient standards in the statute
against which to test the arbitrariness of a park allocation choice.
The issue of direct access limitation has only reached the courts
once, in Wilderness Public Rights Fund v. Aleppe, 54 and the result was
favorable to the Park Service. Wilderness Public Rights Fund involved a
challenge to a 1972 decision of the Secretary limiting use of the Colo-
rado River in the Grand Canyon to 96,600 user days per year and
allocating 92% of the user days to commercial river runners holding
Park Service concessions. In upholding the decision, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded: "If the over-all use of the river must, for the river's
protection, be limited, and if the rights of all are to be recognized,
then the 'free access' of any user must be limited to the extent neces-
sary to accommodate the access rights of others."55 The favoritism
52. 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1976). Some recent enabling legislation for new parks, however, con-
tains more specific management directives. Se., e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 396d(d)(4) (Supp. III 1979)
(Secretary of the Interior shall use "the traditional native Hawaiian Ahupua's concept of land
and water management" in protecting lands around the Kaloko-Honokohau National Histor-
ical Park).
53. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
54. 608 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980).
55. Id. at 1253. In another recent case, litigation challenging restrictions on backcoun-
try use in Mount Rainier National Park was dismissed after the Park Service agreed to liber-
alize the regulations. Penberthy v. Tobin, No. 75-574 (D. Wash. Jan. 11, 1978) (order
dismissing complaint filed), discussedin Suniville, The National Park Idea: A4 Perspective on Use and
Preservation, 6 J. CONTEMP. L. 75, 84-87 (1979).
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shown to concessioners was justified because they performed a public
function in providing "services that the [Park Service] deems desira-
ble for those visiting the area." 56 Wilderness Public Rights Fund is an
important precedent for implementing Professor Sax's policies, al-
though it suggests that some level of access must be maintained,57
and does not foreclose arguments that the Park Service should have
used a less restrictive means of preserving the park.58
B. Legal Duty
Because of the substantial discretion delegated to the Park Serv-
ice, some park management decisions are bound to accommodate the
pressures for greater access opportunities. The discretion of the Sec-
retary then can lead to user encouragement policies.5 9 Judicial chal-
lenges to such decisions will proceed on the theory that the Service
has a duty to restrict access in order to preserve the quality of the
experience for those park users allowed in. In the 1970s environmen-
talists argued that such a duty could be found in the theory that the
national park system was subject to a public trust. The trust theory
derives from the doctrine that the sovereign holds navigable waters
in trust for all citizens. With respect to navigable waters the trust is a
source of public use rights and, in extraordinary situations, of limita-
tions on the power of the state to alienate submerged landsY° In an
influential 1970 article, Professor Sax argued that the major lessons
of the public trust doctrine are proceduraLrather than substantive.6 1
He read the cases to require courts to strictly construe legislation au-
56. 608 F.2d at 1254.
57. See id. at 1253.
58. Cf. Sim v. State Parks & Recreation Comm'n, 94 Wash. 2d 552, 617 P.2d 1028
(1980) (state commission order closing ocean beach highways held invalid).
Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3099 (1981),
also suggests that access limitations might be successfully challenged. On free exercise of
religion grounds, members of the Navajo tribe sued to enjoin the Department of the Interior
from inundating the area surrounding Rainbow Bridge National Monument and allowing
tourists to desecrate a sacred site. Id. at 175-76. Concerning the limitation of public access,
the court noted that "[u]nquestionably the government has a strong interest in assuring pub-
lic access to this natural wonder." Id. at 178. The court, finding Park Service regulations on
visitor conduct adequate to protect the plaintiffs' interests, concluded that a complete ban on
tourists to aid plaintiffs in conducting their religious ceremonies would violate the first
amendment's establishment of religion clause. Id. at 179-80.
59. See, e.g., Friends of Yosemite v. Frizzell, 420 F. Supp. 390, 393 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(holding that the promotion of tourist travel in the parks is within the scope of the enabling
act).
60. E.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 457-59 (1892).
61. See Sax, The Public Trst Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: EJectiveJudicial Internentlon,
68 MICH. L. Rav. 471, 557-65 (1970).
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thorizing resource development or transfer in order to promote dem-
ocratic decisionmaking through remands to the legislature. Other
commentators enthusiastically pushed the public trust doctrine be-
yond the limits articulated by Professor Sax by arguing that all pub-
lic resources were held in trust and that courts should recognize
public rights in public property when resolving conflicts among dif-
ferent proposed uses.62
But apart from the special case of navigable waters, the Supreme
Court has used the concept of the public trust over federal land for a
purpose opposite to that urged by environmentalists. The Court has
said that Congress holds the public lands in trust for all citizens only
for the purpose of confirming Congress's unreviewable discretion
over public land allocation choices.63 The trust is thus standardless.
Further, since the trust concept cannot restrain congressional deci-
sions, it cannot be read as an invitation to the courts to fashion a
common law of environmental duties on Congress's delegates.
Despite the lack of substantive standards in the trust concept, in
1974 the Sierra Club convinced a district court to rely partially on
the public trust to require the Secretary of the Interior to buffer Red-
wood National Park in Northern California. After this success, the
Sierra Club tried to convince Congress to incorporate the trust no-
tion into park system enabling legislation. Congress, however,
balked at using the term because of the uncertainties surrounding its
62. See Note, Aoprdetaqy Duties of the Federal Government Under the Public Land Trust, 75
MIcH. L. REv. 586 (1977); see also Coquillette, Mossesfrom an Old Manse: Another Look at Some
Historic Properp, Cases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761 (1979). Professor Sax
seems to be moving in this direction himself in his most recent statement on the role of the
public trust doctrine in natural resources allocation. In addition to the procedural role that
he has always advocated, he now argues that "the courts can reduce the pressures that claims
of ownership put on public trust resources by looking to the history of common rights. The
courts should recognize that mere unutilized title, however ancient, does not generate the sort
of expectations central to the justness of property claims, and that long standing public uses
have an important place in the analysis." Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctinefrom Its Hitor-
icalShack/es, 14 U.C.D. L. RFv. 185, 194 (1980).
63. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911).
64. Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 95 (N.D. Cal. 1974); see also
Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (general trust
duty imposed upon the National Park Service "to conserve scenery and natural and historic
objects and wildlife" in national parks). Although the court imposed a duty on the Secretary
to protect the park by regulating, pursuant to statute, timber harvesting outside the park, 376
F. Supp. at 95-96, in the final round of litigation it relieved the Secretary of this duty after
concluding that he had made a good faith effort to perform and that the real remedy was
acquisition of a buffer zone. Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D.
Cal. 1976). Congress authorized the acquisition two years later. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 79c, 79c-1,
79n (Supp. III 1979).
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meaning.65 Instead, in 1978 it passed legislation reaffirming existing
law and providing that park management "shall be conducted in
light of the high public value and integrity of the National Park Sys-
tem and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and pur-
poses for which these various areas have been established, except as
may have been or shall be directly and specifically provided by
Congress."66
This section was first construed in Sierra Club v. Andrus, 7 a case
brought by the Sierra Club to force the Department of the Interior to
implement its trust duty to claim reserved water rights in scenic
southern Utah because of the threat to federal interests from energy
development. In Andrus, Judge Richey held that the issue was not
ripe for review and in dictum decided that the 1978 Act formally
"eliminated 'trust' notions in National Park System Management." 68
The 1978 law was found to represent "all the responsibilities which
defendants must faithfully discharge," and the decision was found to
have a rational basis.69
On the other hand, Judge Richey also concluded that the 1978
legislation was intended to place some limits on the Secretary's discre-
tion.70 What those limits might be, he did not say, but Congress may
have given courts a sufficient mandate to require the Service to give
high priority to preservation in management decisions. Nevertheless,
the courts can only overturn a Park Service decision if it is arbitrary.
So, the parks are likely to correspond to Professor Sax's vision only if
Congress and the Park Service want them that way.
C. Park Service Power
The most difficult management problem that the Service faces is
controlling inconsistent development adjacent to the park. Buffer
65. See S. REP. No. 95-528, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977).
66. 16 U.S.C. § la-i (Supp. III 1979).
67. 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980).
68. Id. at 449. A leading public lands scholar, Professor Charles Wilkinson, has recently
argued that it is appropriate for courts to construe the "public trust" as a limitation on
agency discretion as a means of enforcing the shift in public land policy from disposition to
retention and intensive management. Wilkinson, The Public Tust Doctrine in Public Land Law,
14 U.C.D. L. REv. 269 (1980). Wilkinson finds Judge Richey's reading in Andrus of the legis-
lative history of the 1978 amendments to the National Park Service Organic Act "difficult to
support." Id. at 292. He argues further that the Act is a sufficient basis for judicial implica-
tion of trust duties because it "expressly create[s] high duties that set standards not dissimilar
to those imposed on private trustees." Id. at 293-94.
69. 487 F. Supp. at 449 (emphasis in original).
70. Id. at 448-49.
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protection is simply part of the larger question of the Park Service's
power to manage federal property. Although no clear precedent ex-
ists, it seems clear that the federal government may acquire new
lands for parks."' However, the Service's power to implement inter-
nal management choices and assert jurisdiction over private land is
not settled.
There are two basic separate constitutional sources of power over
national parks. The scope of federal power under either source is not
completely settled, in large part because until recently, disposition of
the public domain was the norm and acquisition, if contemplated at
all, the exception.7 2 Since 1934,"3 the federal government has been
committed to a retention and acquisition policy, and this still rela-
tively unexplored corner of constitutional law is slowly adjusting to
this change in policy.
Units of the national park system may either be carved from re-
tained federal lands or acquired from the states or private parties.
The Department of the Interior has jurisdiction over retained lands
under the property clause, 74 but jurisdiction over enclaves-acquired
lands-is governed by individual state laws ceding jurisdiction to the
federal government.75 The law of enclaves is a patchwork of statutes
tied together by loose principles of federal-state relations. The
Supreme Court has interpreted acts of cession strictly against the
states, 76 and thus the federal government generally has exclusive ju-
risdiction over enclaves unless a state expressly retains jurisdiction.
Some nice problems arise over torts, 77 crimes, and the taxing power,
but the law of enclave jurisdiction has not unduly hampered Park
Service internal management.
71. Set Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 530 (1938) (dictum) (quot-
ing James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147 (1937)).
72. ee generally E. PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1951) (history of
the transition from disposition to retention and management).
73. The passage of the Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (current ver-
sion at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315m, 315n, 315o-1 (1976)), is usually cited as the formal end of the
disposition era. See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, .tupra note 12, for a full collection of
materials on this transition.
74. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
75. Jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to the jurisdiction clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 17.
76. See, e.g., Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 224 (1845); G. COGGINS &
C. WILKINSON, .upra note 12, at 60.
77. See Sylvane v. Whelan, 506 F. Supp. 1355 (1981) (since no federal common law of
nuisance for national recreation area exists where state retains concurrent jurisdiction, irate
residents of area cannot prevent nude sunbathing where state law does not prohibit the
conduct).
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Control of inconsistent land development and related activities
on the perimeter of parks is a more difficult issue. As Professor Sax
has demonstrated, the federal government has always had the power
to enjoin activities that create nuisances on federal lands.78 The
Service has recently used this power more aggressively. 79 But the
right to prevent nuisances is of limited value because the common
law does not protect aesthetic interests and because nuisance law
does not reach the general problem of regulating intense develop-
ment around parks such as the Grand Teton and the Great Smoky
Mountains. What is needed is some form of federal land use control.
Until recently the Service did not assert extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion unless jurisdiction was expressly granted by Congress, following
instead the traditional understanding that the federal government's
powers over public lands were only proprietary, not sovereign. 0 The
property clause was thought only to confirm the federal govern-
ment's rights as proprietor of the public lands; sovereignty still rested
with the states. As a result the Service followed a policy of negotia-
tion and deference to local interests, with condemnation as a last re-
sort. Many, including Professor Sax, believed there was too much
deference. In 1976 he wrote an article arguing that Congress has the
power to confer extraterritorial jurisdiction on the Park Service and
that the Department of the Interior has some inherent power to con-
trol activities on the perimeter of parks.8 "
Traditionally, federal land use controls were considered to be po-
litically unpopular and of doubtful constitutional validity. But in
the important case of Kleppe v. New Mexico ,82 the Supreme Court read
the property clause expansively. In upholding the constitutionality
of a law granting the federal government the right to control wild
horses on public lands, it held that the property clause conferred
both sovereign and proprietary powers on the federal government,8 3
and suggested in dictum that the property clause reached activities
78. Sax, Hepless Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of Prvate Lands, 75 MicH. L.
REv. 239, 251 n.61 (1976). The leading case is Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518
(1897).
79. See, e.g., United States v. County Bd., 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979) (unsuccess-
ful effort to prevent high-rises across the Potomac River in Virginia from destroying view of
national monuments in District of Columbia).
80. See Sax, supra note 78, at 245-50. The leading article on the classical theory of
federal power under the property clause is Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Prop-
et,, 18 ARIz. L. REv. 283 (1976).
81. Sax, supra note 78, at 250-58.
82. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
83. Id. at 542-43.
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off of federal lands that adversely affected federal management
objectives.8 4
K eppe is not, however, a complete answer to whether Congress
has the power to adopt extraterritorial land use controls. Federal
land use controls can be attacked on a number of grounds. First, the
legal basis of the Sagebrush rebellion-which seeks state control over
federal public lands-is a combination of arguments, the most ex-
treme of which is that there is no constitutional basis for federal re-
tention of public lands.85 Second is a stronger argument that asserts
that federal power over nonfederal lands is limited by the tenth
amendment. This argument was revived by the Supreme Court's
Delphic opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery.86 In his 1976 arti-
cle, Professor Sax called the opinion "a single distinctive exception"
to expansive readings of federal power,8 7 but this underestimates the
complexity of the issue. In UseO,, the Court held that states could not
be required to obey a federal minimum wage law because the law
impaired a state's "integrity" and its "ability to function effectively
in a federal system. '88 If Usery is read as only preventing Congress
from forcing state legislatures to implement federal programs and
thus depriving them of any choice over budget matters, then the
Useg
, 
decision does not bar federal regulation of private conduct.
Courts have generally upheld the constitutionality of federal environ-
mental and land use programs in the face of challenges based on
Usery, at least where state participation is optional.89
Federal land use regulation was strongly endorsed in two recent
unanimous Supreme Court opinions upholding the major land use
controls mandated by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
84. Id. at 546 (citing Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897)).
85. Wilkinson, The Field of ueblic Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions,
I PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1980), summarizes the arguments being advanced by the
western states. The most detailed analysis of the issues is Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebruh Rebel-
liot." Law, Politics and Federal Lands, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 317 (1980).
86. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
87. Sax, supra note 78, at 256.
88. 426 U.S. at 852.
89. See, e.g., Concerned Citizens of Appalachia, Inc. v. Andrus, 494 F. Supp. 679 (E.D.
Tenn. 1980) (federal regulation of private conduct with optional state participation); Pacific
Legal Foundation v. Costle, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2121, 2127-28 (E.D. Cal. 1980)
(threatened elimination of flow of federal funds used as "carrot and stick" program to en-
courage compliance), afd, 627 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1354 (1981).
But cf. Walker Field v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290, 300 (10th Cir. 1979) (McKay, J., dissenting)
("[T]he spending power itself obligates responsible dispursal of funds collected through fed-
eral power.").
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Act 9° against tenth amendment challenges.9 Surface mining con-
trols are imposed on the states through "cooperative" federalism
under the commerce power, so the issue of the federal government's
power to impose extraterritorial land use controls under the property
power remains theoretically open. However, the Court also limited
Usery so as to apply to a very narrow range of federal intrusions on
state sovereignty,92 and its analysis suggests that federal control of
private land use choices to carry out a constitutional objective will be
valid under the tenth amendment.
How much extraterritorial regulation is desirable is a sensitive
problem, but Congress should be free to solve it, with appropriate
deference to local interests, free from tenth amendment constraints.
Professor Sax has concluded that the competing interests of local con-
trol, individual choice, and federal protection of public lands can be
accommodated by legislation that gives the Park Service the power
to define "very broadly" what adjoining activities create nuisance-
like conditions. 93 This proposal stops short of conferring on the Serv-
ice general authority to control land use, but allows the Department
of the Interior to correct the major defects, as far as the national
parks are concerned, in the common law of nuisance. Courts are
slow to expand existing grounds for nuisance claims, so the Service
needs the power to define nuisance-like activity for itself in light of
the distinctive needs of the national park system.
In the long run, a wide variety of controls may have to be used to
buffer the park system from inconsistent development. Increased
land acquisition supplemented by regulatory decisions under the pre-
vention of significant deterioration provision of the Clean Air Act94
and the withdrawal of lands from coal mining pursuant to section
522 of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 95 will be the
90. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979).
91. See Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
92. In Hodel v. Virginia Mining & Reclamation Association, the Court held that an Usery
challenge must satisfy each of the following three requirements: "First, there must be a show-
ing that the challenged statute regulates the 'States as States.' Second, the federal regulation
must address matters that are indisputably 'attributes of state sovereignty.' And third, it
must be apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their
ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions.' " 101 S. Ct. at 2366
(citations omitted).
93. Sax, supra note 78, at 266.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 7491 (Supp. III 1979).
95. 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (Supp. III 1979). Section 522 of the Act allows the Secretary of
the Interior to designate federal lands as unsuitable for strip mining. A similar process exists
for state and private lands. This procedure, which could become a general federal and state
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primary means of protecting the parks. Professor Sax has begun to
address this problem in his study of the costs of the Park Service's
refusal to make advance land acquisitions,96 but a full agenda of land
use issues awaits Professor Sax and others.
CONCLUSION
In his book and related law review articles, Professor Sax has out-
lined an aggressive park preservation policy and a means to achieve
it. Mountains Without Handrails is an important contribution to the
public lands literature and deserves to be widely read and debated.
Although I would not follow fully his recommendations for all units
of the system, and find the problems of perimeter protection even
more complex than he does, I share his passion for the national parks
and what they represent to this country. To many his vision will be
static and elegiac. At a time when people ask whether travel is still
possible in an age of tourism, one can legitimately ask whether Pro-
fessor Sax has described a role for the parks for which there is little
demand and therefore little possibility of realization. Be that as it
may, in my judgment, Professor Sax's vision of the national parks is
the right one. It should be honored by Congress, the Department of
the Interior, and, when appropriate, the courts.
land use planning process, was used to protect Bryce Canyon National Park from noise and
dust from proposed mines in southwestern Utah. The Secretary of the Interior's designation
of certain coal lands close to the park as unsuitable for surface mining is now in litigation.
Sierra Club v. Watt, No. 81-0172 (D. Utah, filed Mar. 13, 1981); Utah v. Watt, No. 81-0093
(D. Utah, filed Feb. 13, 1981); Utah Int'l v. Department of Interior, No. 81-0090 (D. Utah,
filed Feb. 12, 1981).
96. Sax, Buying Senery: LandAcquiritions For the National Park Sevice, 1980 DuKE L.J. 709.
In brief, Professor Sax urges a policy of advance acquisitions and, for those who prefer to stay,
the purchase of development rights with a limited recapture of the value of living near a park.
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